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Exports and American divergence. Lost decades and Emancipation 
collapse in Latin American and the Caribbean 1820-1870. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The period 1820-1870, or ‘lost decades’, is widely regarded as the key moment in the opening 
of gap between Latin America and the Unites States. We test this statement with a new set of 
export series. We show that the performance of Latin American countries was quite good, 
although not outstanding. Mexico was hit by foreign policy crisis, but the only real basket case 
have been the British and French colonies in the Caribbean. The emancipation of slaves caused 
a collapse in their exports, favoring other tropical countries, including Cuba and Brazil. 
Further South, independent countries such as Argentine and Chile increased their share of 
world trade. In a nutshell, most of the divergence in the 1820-1870 in the Americas was 
between tropical countries rather than between Latin America and North America.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Mexican president, Porfirio Diaz, said once 'Poor Mexico, so far from God and so 
close to the United States'.  In economic history, this statement holds true for the whole 
continent South of the Rio Grande. Its economic performance is routinely compared 
with the American one and the results are not flattering. On the eve of World War One, 
the average GDP per capita of the whole Latin America was less than a third of the 
American one (Maddison 2014).  Yet in 1500 Mexico and Peru had undoubtedly been 
richer than North America. The timing of this ‘reversal of fortunes’ is still uncertain. 
Acemoglu et al (2002 p.1258) conclude “that the reversal in relative incomes took place 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and it was linked to 
industrialization”, but this dating is not unanimously shared. The recent estimates by 
Allen et al (2012) and Arroyo Abad et al (2012, Figure 1) feature a sizeable gap in real 
wages between North and South America since the late 16th century and push the start 
of the divergence further back in time: the United States were much richer than Peru 
throughout the 18th century, almost as rich as Mexico around 1720 and about a quarter 
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richer around 1780. On the contrary, according to the avowedly optimist view of 
Dobado (2015), levels of consumption in Latin America were close to Northern 
American ones (and higher than most European ones) in early 19th century. By 
definition, the larger the gap in GDP per capita in 1800, the better the relative 
performance in the 19th century. 
    These opinions are still based on limited quantitative evidence, in spite of 
noteworthy recent progress. Data on GDP per capita are  available for only some 
countries, sometimes only for few benchmark years, and the data are sometimes quite 
shaky. Many scholars have inferred that performance of Latin American countries must 
have been poor because their political history was very troubled. Others have used as 
proxy exports per capita, under the assumption that in the early 19th century, exports to 
the industrializing core were the main or sole source of growth for the periphery  (Bates 
et al 2007, Prados de la Escosura 2009, Bulmer Thomas 2003 and 2012, Bertola and 
Ocampo 2014). In this paper, we follow this latter tradition, relying on our new estimate 
of world trade since 1800 (Federico and Tena 2016a). We are able to make two new 
specific contributions. First, we consider all polities in the Americas, including the 
Caribbean, which have so far been are the subject of a parallel (and similarly 
pessimistic) literature. Second, we frame the performance of exports from American 
countries in the growth of world trade during the first globalization (Federico and Tena 
2016b).  
    After a survey of the literature on the ‘lost decades’ (Section Two), in Section 
Three we present the available data on GDP and trade. The quantitative analysis of 
export performance suggests a division of South American polities in three groups, 
which we deal with in more detail in the rest of the paper. Section Four focuses on the 
performance of major temperate independent countries, which ranged from the decent 
(Mexico) to the outstanding (Peru). Section Five outlines the massive changes in the 
world market for tropical products, which featured the rise of Spanish colonies (Cuba 
and Puerto Rico) and Brazil, as well as of non-American competitors, and the decline of 
the once-domineering British and French colonies. In Section Six, we discuss how 
much this latter depended on the effects of slave emancipation. Section Seven 
concludes. 
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2. The literature on the lost decades: Independence and  Emancipation 
The pessimist view suggest three different, but surely not mutually exclusive, 
mechanisms to explain the poor performance of newly independent countries 
 First, political fragmentation after independence caused South America to lose all the 
scale advantages Spanish colonial empire had offered (Bates et al 2007). The common 
currency and legal system could have helped the development of a single market 
(Irigoin 2003), and indeed there is evidence of modest convergence of prices inside 
some regions, although trade between viceroyalties was still limited (Gallo and 
Newland 2004). In contrast, independence brought national currencies, with different 
(and often unsound) monetary policies and, in most cases, also protectionism. All the 
new states increased duties to raise revenue, and high protection settled as a persistent 
feature of the Latin American history (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004).1 
Second, the Spanish (and, to some extent, Portuguese) rule had left extractive 
institutions. Spain extracted huge revenues from the empire, the colonies were 
forbidden to trade with foreign countries and trade with Spain was heavily regulated, 
the colonial society was highly hierarchical, the Church enjoyed a privileged status, and 
property rights on land were poorly defined and insecure (Coatsworth 1997, 2006, 2008 
Mahoney 2010). After independence, trade was liberalized, but other extractive 
institutions remained, and, if any, the power of the élite grew as it was no longer 
constrained by the Spanish crown (Coatsworth 1998). In a series of celebrated papers, 
Engermann and Sokoloff (1997, 2002, 2005 and 2011) have argued that land 
concentration and the ensuing concentration of local power reduced investments in 
public goods, such as education and infrastructures, which were critical for long-run 
sustained growth.  
The most common explanation of the divergence, however, points to the 
dysfunctional politics of the newly independent countries: “In the half century following 
independence the presence of widespread political instability and violence distinguished much 
of Latin America, especially Spanish America, from the United States” (North et al. 2000, 
p.28). They were plagued by constant political turmoil, which often erupted in civil and 
foreign wars. Spain made steady efforts to reconquer its colonies until well into the 
                                                          
1
 Duties on British cotton goods from main Latin American countries (Argentine, Brazil, Chile , 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela)  were as high as 68% in 1846 and they halved to 32% 
in 1863 (Tena-Junguito et al. 2012). 
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1830s and other European powers enforced upon blockades and military interventions 
to defend their markets and their geostrategic influence. Mexico was particularly hit 
because of its location. It lost Texas in 1836 and then half of its remaining territory in 
1846-1848 to the United States, and on top of this, was twice invaded by the French, in 
the so-called Pastry War of 1838-1839 and again in 1861-1867.  But all countries were 
affected by wars: Centeno (1997 Tab 1 and 2) lists 10 foreign wars for Argentina, 6 for 
Brazil, 5 for Uruguay and Mexico, 4 for Chile and 3 for Colombia.   War-related deaths 
peaked during the independence wars, but remain high until 1870 (Bates et al 2007 
Table 1).  Also political violence is deemed largely a colonial legacy (North et al 2000).  
The states fought over borders and social groups and regions within each state strove for 
power in order to defend or expand their privileges. This climate of violence was bound 
to discourage foreign and domestic investments and harm growth. Furthermore, wars 
were expensive: between 1822 and 1860, military expenditures averaged between 50 to 
77 percent of total budgets in Latin America (Centeno 1997, Tab.2 and Halperin 
2008/1969 pp.136-138). The situation started to improve in the 1860s. In most 
countries, civil wars had ended and liberal political forces had taken office, abolishing 
most of the “ancient regime” rules affecting land and internal customs but also 
implementing modern commercial and civil codes (Stein and Stein 1970).  On the other 
hand, liberal reforms reduced franchise and stripped the native community of their 
residual powers and the export boom increased inequality. 
The pessimistic view of the ‘lost decades’ has not gone unchallenged.2 Dye 
(2006) reminds that institutional framework of post-independence countries was complex and 
not uniformly bleak. Chile combined a prosper economy with a stable government after 
Independence (see Rector 1986 and Salazar and Pinto 2003).  Argentine experienced  a soft 
institutional transition because the free trade interest  in Buenos Aires overcome easily the 
opposition from land owners from inland states (Amaral 1993). On a more general vein, Llopis 
and Marichal (2009, p.12) point out that the slow growth after Independence was 
anyway better than the even more disappointing growth of Spain and Portugal in the 
early 19th century. The most consistent critic  of the pessimistic view is Prados de la 
Escosura (Prados de la Escosura and Amaral 1993 Prados de la Escosura 2009). He 
admits that the end of transfers to Spain did not compensate the losses from 
                                                          
2
  Grafe and Irigoin (2006, 2008) and Irigoin (2015) have questioned the traditional view of the Spanish 
empire as extractive. 
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fragmentation of the market and from the post-independence political turmoil, but he 
argues that on balance the new countries gained thanks to the new opportunities for 
exports to Europe after the liberalization of trade. Other authors are more cautious, 
suggesting that the positive effect of exports was not large enough to lift whole 
continent off and that growth concentrated in the coastal regions (Bulmer-Thomas 
2003), which had easier access to foreign markets (Bertola and Ocampo 2014 pp. 75-
79).   
Dysfunctional institutions or political turmoil cannot explain the evolution of the 
Caribbean, as all islands but Hispaniola (Haiti and Dominican Republic) remained 
European colonies throughout the period. The conventional wisdom is thoroughly 
pessimistic: the islands were badly hit by the abolition of slavery and did not recover 
until the end of the century. The traditional interpretation, as shaped by Williams 
(1944), considered the abolition a consequence of an irreversible economic decline of 
the plantation system, but this view is no longer accepted. Drescher  (1977, 1999) has 
argued that the plantation system was as efficient in the Caribbean as in the Southern 
United States (Fogel and Engerman 1973, Fogel 1989) The abolition was an ‘economic 
suicide’, as it disrupted the system and caused  a collapse in production and exports. 
This collapse helped exports of other tropical producers in the Americas, but this link 
has been totally overlooked so far.    
 
3. Measuring the performance of the Americas: GDP and wages 
   Table 1 reports the data on GDP per capita at constant prices for in American polities 
in 1800, 1820 and 1870 and the corresponding rates of change according to Maddison 
and to the two main comparative studies on Latin American polities during the ‘lost 
decades’ 
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Table 1 
GDP per capita and growth (1990 PPP $) in the Americas 
 
 
 
The initial GDP figures tally well with the view by Allen et al (2012) and Arroyo Abad 
and Van Zanden (2012) about the size of income gaps at the end of the colonial period 3. 
Subsequent changes, in spite of the differences among estimates, are broadly consistent 
with the conventional wisdom. They do show a substantial variance in rates among 
countries. Chile and Uruguay matched the growth of the United States, but the 
performance of the two largest economies of the continent was disappointing, to say the 
least. Mexican income stagnated according to Cardenas (1997) and Salvucci (1993) and 
declined according to Coatsworth (1978, 2005). The rates for the Caribbean, if 
cumulated over fifty years imply a fall by 15%  in GDP for the whole area and by 30% 
in Jamaica only.  Some very recent works offer a more optimistic view of the economic 
performance of the Americas. The new estimates of GDP by Lindert and Williamson 
(2016) imply a substantially higher level of GDP per capita and a faster growth before 
                                                          
3Arroyo Abad and Van Zanden (2014) suggest a slightly lower figure for Mexico (813 dollars) and put 
forward an estimate for Peru (665 dollars) in 1800.  
1800 1820 1870 rate 1820 1870 rate 1820 1870 rate
Canada 904 1695 1.26
USA 1296 1361 2445 1.17 1257 2445 1.33
Argentina 931 998 1468 0.77 1249 1837 0.77 998 1468 0.77
Brazil 683 683 713 0.09 652 680 0.08 597 694 0.3
Chile 626 605 1290 1.51 607 1295 1.52 710 1320 1.24
Colombia 591 533 676 0.48 423 539 0.48 607 676 0.22
Cuba 503 644 927 0.73 583 838 0.73 695 1065 0.85
Mexico 836 627 651 0.08 695 720 0.07 733 651 -0.24
Uruguay 1088 1165 2181 1.25 1004 1880 1.25
Venezuela 415 375 570 0.84 347 529 0.84 460 570 0.43
Jamaica 701 530 -0.56
639 794 0.43
667 674 0.02
636 549 -0.3
628 776 0.42 648 813 0.45 684 772 0.24
World 712 884 0.43
Sources:  Maddison (2014) ;  Prados de la Escosura (2009 Tab. 6); Bertola and Ocampo (2014)Tab A.1 and 2.4
Prados de la Escosura Bertola and Ocampo
L. America
15 L. America
21 Caribbean
8 core countries
Maddison
7 
 
the civil war (with a decline in the 1860s)4. T GDP per capita declined over the whole 
period 1820-1870 in Venezuela, but grew quite fast in Brazil and Peru. 5 Unfortunately, 
these GDP data are tentative at best and incomplete and indeed are corrected by the 
results of more recent work. 
  Some authors have suggested to use real wages as proxy of GDP. This approach is 
correct only under strict conditions (see Broadberry et al 2014) and anyway the results 
for  Mexico City (Challú and Gomez-Galvariato (2015) and Lima (Arroyo Abad, 2014) 
are not clear cut. Real wages of unskilled workers fluctuated a lot without any long-term 
trend. In both countries, wages hit a trough during the independence war, recovered in 
the 1830s and 1840s and fell sharply in the 1850s and 1860s, but the size of the 
fluctuation is much greater in Lima than in Mexico City. 
 
4. Measuring the performance of the Americas: exports 
   Our data-base includes  yearly series of exports at current and  constant prices for all 
43 American policies since 1820 and, since 1823, 18 polities in other continents 
(Federico and Tena 2016a). Jointly, these 62 polities (henceforth ‘world’) accounted for 
about four fifths of world exports in 1850 and in 1870.  From  1823-25 to 1869-1871, 
‘world’ trade grew by 5.5 times, while American exports  increased only by four times. 
The American share (at current prices) remained slightly below 30%  until the mid 
1830s, declined slowly to about a quarter on the eve of the American Civil War and 
collapsed to about 20% in the 1860s and recovered only towards the end of the century. 
Figure 1 plots separately the United States, as the implicit yardstick of the whole 
continent, the other North American countries (i.e. mostly Canada), the colonies (almost 
totally coinciding with the Caribbean) and the independent countries, which included 
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, jointly accounting for about 60% of the total. 
 
 
                                                          
4 They estimate the rate of change as 1.4% in 1800-1860 (partially to recover from the ravavges of the 
Independence war) -0.3% in 1860-1870 and 1.16% over the whole period 1800-1870. The figures of GDP 
in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars (1930  in 1800, 3250 in 1860 and 3100 in 1870) can be obtained by 
multiplying the British data by the authors’ estimates of the difference between the two countries.  
5 The rates, all computed from three-year moving averages, are -0.3% for Venezuela, 1831-1870 (De 
Corso 2013), 1.2% for Brazil (Tombolo 2013) and 1.7% Peru 1825-1870 (Seminario 2015). The GDP per 
capita in Peru was higher in 1870 than on the eve of World War One. 
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Figure 1 
Shares on ‘world’ trade, current prices 
   
 
  Sources: Federico-Tena (2016a) 
 
  
Shares of the independent countries and the other North America remained broadly 
constant in the long run. The United States managed to increase their share of world 
trade until the Civil war, thanks to the almost parallel increase of exports of tobacco and 
cotton from the South and wheat flour and cotton manufactures from the North. 6  The 
decline of America’s share on ‘world’ trade reflects the collapse of exports from the 
colonies in the 1830s and early 1840s (partially compensated by the rise of exports from 
the United States) and of exports from the Southern USA during the civil war and its 
aftermath. 7  
  
  These shares, although informative, may give a biased view of the performance to the 
extent that total export depend also on the size of the economy – i.e. on population and 
GDP per capita. As said, the available data on this latter are quite uncertain, while our 
                                                          
6
 Tobacco and cotton accounted for about a half of American exports (and for 6-8% of world trade) from 
the 1820s to the eve of the Civil war, with a peak of almost two thirds in the 1830s. Exports from the 
North were more diversifies – wheat (wheat flour) and cotton manufactures increased in the 1850s and 
1860s (data from Historical Statistics of the United States 2006 series Ee 571, Ee 573, Ee575-576). 
7
  The decline of share of Southern USA accounts for 140% of the decline from 1858-60 to 1868-1870. 
Exports from Northern America (defined as total exports less cotton and tobacco) increased from 5.6% 
to 6.7% of world trade. 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
1823 1828 1833 1838 1843 1848 1853 1858 1863 1868
Independent South America Colonies South America
USA Other North America
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estimates suggest that the population of Americas with the notable exception of 
European (non Spanish) colonies grew faster than the world population.8  Indeed, as 
Figure 2 shows, thirty five out of American countries, including the United States, 
underperformed the rest of the world in terms of rate of growth of export per capita (3.6 
%). 9 
               
Figure 2 
Rates of growth, export per capita, 1820-1870 
 
Sources: The corresponding numbers with countries and groups are showed in Table 1 Appendix.  
 
 
Export per capita declined in sixteen polities and all of them but three 
(Dominican Republic, Porto Rico and Uruguay) were European colonies. All eight 
success stories were independent countries, including four out of five Central American 
tropical countries (Costarica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua). Furthermore, 
only three country-specific rates of growth (Peru, Bolivia and Nicaragua) significantly 
exceed the world rate.   
                                                          
8
 The share of Americas on world population almost doubled, from 3.7% in 1820 to 6.4% in 1870, while 
that of European colonies remained stable around 1.3% (data from Federico and Tena 2017).  
9
 We compute the rate of change of the i-th series as w=- β/ψ, where β and ψ  are coefficients from a 
regression (Razzaque et al 2007) Δ Ln Wt=α+β TIME+ψ lnWt-1+ φ ln Δ Ln W t-1 +u. 
-6
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-2
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 These comparisons may be deemed unfair, as they do not take into account the initial 
level of export per capita. Ceteris paribus, it is much easier to increase export per capita 
starting from a low than from a high level. Indeed, the Americas exported 
proportionally more than any other extra-European continent before the French 
Revolution, the value of American sugar exported to Europe was four times larger than 
total Asian exports, and American exports, including other tropical products and silver 
from Mexico and Peru, might have been ten times larger (De Vries 2010). In the early 
1820s, the differences in export per capita between the Americas and the rest of the 
world, and among different groups of polities within the Americas, were still very wide 
(see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 
Export per capita in 1823-1825 (1913 $) 
Americas 5.31 North America 7.30 USA 5.73 
Asia 0.27 
Independent 
2.38 Mexico 2.20 
Temperate 
Europe 1.93 
Independent 
tropical 
3.32 Brazil 3.48 
Oceania 1.79* Spanish colonies 7.22 Cuba 7.77 
World 1.36 European colonies 26.81 Jamaica 29.40 
*1826-1828. Source: Exports Federico and Tena (2016a) and population Federico and Tena (2017) 
 
Only the five Central American independent countries exported less than the 
average of the rest of the world without the Americas (0.93 1913 dollars), while the 
average exports per capita of ¨European colonies¨ in the 1820s exceeded exports per 
capita of 93 of 130 polities in 1913. The decline of their exports in the next half  a 
century greatly reduced but did not close the gap: in 1869-1871, export per capita from 
the (other) European colonies were ‘only’ 80% higher than the average of the rest of the 
continent, rather than five times higher as in the early 1820s. In the following, we will 
discuss in more detail the causes of these differences in export performance among the 
different groups of polities.  
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Before that, it is necessary to ask how much representative are exports per capita 
of overall economic growth. As said, most authors deem the growth in export per capita 
as an upper bound of GDP growth. It is possible to test this hypothesis for seven South 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba since 1820, Peru since 
1826 and Venezuela since 1830) and for the United States since 1820 (Federico and 
Tena 2016b).  In all of them, but Brazil (and the United States) the export/GDP ratio at 
current prices rose in the long run. The size of the increase and its time pattern differ 
somewhat across countries but in all cases but Argentina and Cuba, the increase 
concentrates in the early decades. Indeed, the aggregate ratio (Figure 3) grew in the 
1820s and 1830s and remained essentially flat thereafter.  Note how these countries 
were much open than the United States throughout the period, even if their export per 
capita were 20% lower. 
 
Figure 3 
Export/ GDP ratios  
 
Sources: Federico-Tena (2016b)  
 
One can tentatively conclude that, at least for these countries, export per capita 
do overestimate the growth in GDP per capita, but mostly in the initial period. 
Furthermore, these countries performed better than the average, and five of them were 
in the upper third of the list of polities from Figure 2. It is unlikely that the export/GDP 
increased much in other countries, and in especially where exports per capita declined  
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5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
South America 1830 sample South America 1820 sample
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5. The lost decades?  Mexico and the temperate independent countries  
In the previous Section, we have hinted that independent countries performed 
quite well in the ‘lost decades’.  Indeed, colonies which before Independence had 
already combined their participation to the domestic colonial market with a greater 
openness to metropolitan and world market, such as Chile, could exploit well the 
opportunities of the globalizing post-Waterloo world (Gellman 2009). However, this 
was not necessarily the case of Mexico, the most populous Latin American countries 
from independence to the 1860s. Colonial Mexico exported mostly silver and it was 
around two thirds of world total silver around the turn of the 18th century (Dobado-
Marrero 2001, p.285).  Mining was hit hard during the independence war and 
production in the 1820s was about half the pre-war level (Cardenas 1997 Tab.1). It 
recovered very slowly in the 1830s and in the first half of the 1840s, but then the 
recovery accelerated in the second half, with an overall yearly growth rate of 2.2 in the 
period 1821-1850 (Sánchez-Santiró 2009 p.81). Indeed, our series of export per capita 
(Figure 4), based on the new estimates by Kuntz and Tena (2017), show a long-term 
upward trend, with an acceleration in the 1850s and the early 1860s and deep crises 
during the war with the USA  and in the second half of the 1860s.  
 
Figure 4 
Export per capita (1913$):  representative  independent countries 
  
 Sources: Federico-Tena (2016a) 
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The overall growth raise doubts about the conventional wisdom on the alleged 
poor performance of the Mexican economy during the ‘lost decades’. Historians 
attributed it to domestic political instability, featuring military coups and popular 
uprising, and not just to the colonial heritage (see Bates et al 2007 and Dobado et al 
2008).  In contrast, Sánchez-Santiró (2009) has recently argued that these were mostly 
urban and short-lived events, which did not affect the rest of the economy, at least until 
the second half of the 1850s. Our series support this latter view – suggesting that export 
collapsed in coincidence with and thus probably because of external crises. 
Furthermore, trends tally fairly well with the population growth estimates by McCaa 
(1993), the real wage series by Challu and Gomez-Alvariato (2014) and the evidence 
about the resilience of subsistence agriculture, which employed the vast majority of the 
population, fared better than mining or commercial agriculture (Tutino 1986, Cardenas 
1997).   
Figure 4 plots exports per capita for the three other largest temperate 
independent countries. They all were success stories, in spite of a rather different post-
independence political history. North et al (2000) single out Chile, jointly with Brazil, 
as a haven of political stability and indeed the country attained the highest rate of GDP 
growth in the ‘lost decades’ (Tab 1).  It was a classic case of export-led growth, fueled 
by the discoveries of silver veins and of accessible deposit of copper which production 
rose from 1.5 million kg before independence to around 18 million kg in the 1850s 
(Llorca-Jaña 2012).  From the early 1820s to 1870, export increased by 14 times (by 6.1 
times in per capita terms) and Chile tripled its share of the world exports, from 0.23% to 
0.68%.  
  The two other countries did not enjoy any political stability. North et al (2000 
p.45) quote Peru, alongside Mexico, as the ‘archetypal’ cases of dysfunctional 
institutions. Argentina waged several wars, which caused blockades to the harbor of 
Buenos Ayres (by the Brazilian in 1826-1828, the French in 1838-1840 and the Anglo-
French in 1845-1848), that caused temporary collapses in export (Figure 3). Yet, both 
countries succeeded to increase their share of world exports during the ‘lost decades’, 
respectively from 1.12% to over 1.79% and from 0.21% to 0.46%. Argentina exported 
salted meat, hides and wool, and the boom of exports reflects expansion of cattle raising 
on the land seized from the natives. The acreage for pasture tripled, the number of cattle 
and the cattle herd expanded from 1 million to 6 million in addition to 38 million of 
14 
 
sheep (Gellman 2009, p.36). The case of Peru is slightly different as unlike Argentina or 
Chile, it changed its main staple. Colonial Peru was to some extent similar to Colonial 
Mexico: it developed internal market around mining cities and exported mostly silver to 
Spain (Contreras and Cueto 2004). As in Mexico, production of silver plummeted 
during independence war (Arroyo Abad 2014). By 1840, it was back at pre-war levels, 
but since then it stagnated and silver was substituted as main staple by guano and other 
minor commodities such as saltpeter and wool after 1850 (Hunt 1984)). The growth of 
exports caused GDP to rise fast, but real wages stagnated after the 1850s: most of the 
gains of the guano boom accrued to the rich (Arroyo Abad 2014). 
  It would be possible to continue this description considering other countries, but 
the message is clear. Most independent (non-tropical) countries managed to exploit the 
growth of world demand during the first globalization and exports were the main driver 
of their economic growth. Political turmoil and poor institutions did not necessarily 
prevent success on the world market. 
 
5. The Americas and the competition on the market for tropical products 
      In the previous Section, we have dealt with each country separately because each of 
them was a fairly small player in world markets for its staple, with the possible 
exception of silver and the sure exception of Peruvian guano.  This approach is not 
suitable for the polities located between the two Tropics. They exported almost 
exclusively tropical products (Table 4 a) and until 1830, they dominated the world 
market (Table 4 b). The European tropical colonies supplied 60% of sugar (and  Brazil 
and Spanish colonies a further 30%), Brazil, the Spanish colonies, the British and 
French colonies and the independent American countries (including Haiti) a fifth of 
coffee consumption each and the Southern United States two thirds of world cotton (and 
all other American polities and additional sixth). In the next forty years, American 
polities lost their dominant position and in 1870 polities other than the United States 
supplied ‘only’ a quarter of world export of tropical products. 
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Table 3 
The market for tropical goods 
 Brazil British 
Colonies 
in 
America 
French 
colonies 
in 
America 
Cuba 
and 
Puerto 
Rico 
Other 
tropical 
countries 
USA Other Non 
tropical 
producers 
Share of tropical products on total domestic exports 
1830 78.4% 100.0% 100.0% 92.7%  62.4%  
1850 84.1% 100.0% 100.0% 93.8%  78.2%  
1870 85.9% 100.0% 100.0% 97.9%  78.6%  
1913 90.3% 100.0% 100.0% 94.1%  36.4%  
Share of polity on world trade of tropical goods  
1830 8.8% 17.7% 5.1% 8.4% 26.3% 17.6% 16.2% 
1850 12.2% 5.2% 1.9% 9.8% 28.9% 29.4% 12.4% 
1870 9.9% 3.9% 1.5% 10.4% 33.5% 28.5% 12.4% 
1913 12.4% 1.5% 0.5% 7.5% 39.4% 29.1% 9.7% 
Source Federico and Tena (forthcoming)  
 
  Trends in export per capita  confirm the stark contrast between the collapse of the European 
colonies and the rise of other suppliers (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 
Export per capita (1913$): American tropical polities 
 
    Sources: Federico-Tena (2016a) 
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The rise of export per capita from the Southern United States reflects the four-
fold growth of exports of cotton, from 280 million pounds in 1830 to 1,424 in 1860 and 
the doubling of export of tobacco, from 82 to 164 million pounds (Historical Statistics 
USA 2006 series Ee 570 and Ee572). This success thus was independent from the crisis 
of the European tropical colonies, which in 1830 did not export tobacco and accounted 
for only 2% of world cotton trade. The export per capita collapsed from 20.8 to 1.1-1.6 
during the Civil War, but the Southern United States managed to remain the largest 
supplier of cotton and tobacco until 1913, with 65% and 31% of world exports (vs 73% 
and 49% in 1850). Thus, their share of ‘world’ trade recovered to 4.4% on the eve of 
World War One. 
  Export per capita from Cuba and Puerto Rico increased more than fivefold and 
succeeded in maintaining about 1.5% of world exports from the 1820s to the 1870s, 
with peaks over 1.7%. Sugar and its derivatives accounted for 55% of total Cuban 
exports in 1820 and for to over 80% fifty years later, while exports of coffee 
disappeared (Federico and Tena forthcoming). The output of sugar increased by 14 
times (Deer 1949), mostly thanks to substantial investments funded by Spanish and 
local capital (Dye 1998, Santamaria and Garcia 2004 pp. 177-8). The key innovation 
was the centralization of processing in large steam-powered mills (called Central) which 
crushed the cane of several plantations, and the construction of sugar plantation 
railways to carry the highly perishable cane from the fields to the factory. This strategy 
paid off, as the Spanish colonies increased their share on world sugar exports from 15% 
in 1830 to 38% in 1870 (Federico and Tena 2016c). Our constant market share analysis 
shows that this success would have augmented their share on total world exports by half 
a percentage point, had not it been more than compensated by a decline in the share of 
sugar on world trade,   
   Brazil followed a different development path, which featured a change in 
specialization and a shift in location of the production for exports from Bahia, 
Pernambuco in the North-East to Rio, San Paulo and Minas Gerais in the South (Leff 
1973 and 1997, Klein and Vidal Luna 2010). In the early 1820s, sugar accounted for 
about a quarter of total exports, coffee for about a fifth and cotton for a sixth (Absell 
and Tena 2016).  In the next half a century, exports of  cotton remained constant 
(with a spike in the 1860s and early 1870s, exports of sugar increased by 2.5 times 
(peaking in the mid-1850s) and exports of coffee by almost twenty times. Coffee 
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overtook sugar as main Brazilian staple around 1830, and grew up to half or more 
of all exports from the 1850s onwards. The Southern states had a favorable 
climate, a lot of fertile land and a 'vast informal credit market' (Frank 2005), but the 
growth of coffee production was initially hampered by poor infrastructure and high 
transportation costs (Klein 1990). However, the bottleneck was solved by the 
construction of railways in the 1860s, meeting the requests by the coffee planters 
(Summerhill 2005 and 2006).  This development path was initially very successful: 
Brazil export per capita fourfold from early twenties to 1850´s and  almost doubled 
its share of world exports, from 2.2% in the late 1820s to  (almost) 4% thirty years 
later.  The gains in markets for tropical products account for all the growth in the share 
of Brazil on world trade in those years (Federico and Tena 2015c). From 1850 to 1870, 
Brazil broadly succeeded to maintain its share on world market of tropical products, but 
lost competiveness on non-tropical exports (minerals) and was hit by changes in the 
composition of world trade. Thus, at the end of the ‘lost decades’ its share of world 
market was down to about 2.8%.  
In spite of all differences, these three success-stories share a common trait, the   
persistence of slavery until the end of the period. In the early 1860s, there were 3.95 
million slaves in the United States, up from 1.55 in 1820, 1.5 million in Brazil, up from 
1.1 in 1819, and around 400.000 in Cuba and Puerto Rico (Historical Statistics 2007, 
Klein and Vidal Luna 2010 p.76, Klein 1986 Tab 1 and 2). The growth in Brazilian 
slave workforce may seem modest relative to the surge in exports, but slaves were 
increasingly concentrated in the booming Southern states. They accounted for about a 
third of all Brazilian slaves in 1819 (around 0.4 million) and for about a half in 1872 
(over 0.7 millions).  As it is well known, slavery was abolished in the United States in 
1865, and this marked the start of its demise in the whole Western Hemisphere. It was 
abolished in Puerto Rico in 1873, and the Spanish and Brazilian governments approved 
the so-called free-womb laws (the Moret Law, 1870 and the Rio Branco Law in 1871) 
which freed all children of slaves (Schmidt-Nowara 2010).  Import of slaves had been 
outlawed in Puerto Rico since 1844, in Brazil since 1850 (after a bombardment by the 
Royal Navy) and in Cuba since 1866 and thus these laws implied a gradual withering of 
slavery. Slavery was formally abolished in Cuba in 1886 and in Brazil two years later, 
but the system was already collapsing because slaves were leaving in droves the 
fazendas (Klein and Vidal Luna 2010).  By then, Brazil was substituting slaves with 
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Italian immigrants and its share on the  world market of  tropical products (i.e. coffee) 
increased to 12.4% in 1890.  
 
   
          6. The collapse of Caribbean exports and the emancipation  
 Exports of Tropical European (i.e. British and French) colonies grew quite fast in the 
1820s, up to about 45 million (1913) dollars in 1828-1830, equivalent to 6.9% of  
‘world’ trade. In the next twenty years, total exports halved to 22 millions, and their 
share collapsed to about 2%. About two thirds of this collapse is explained by loss 
market share in tropical products (Federico and Tena 2016c). Exports did recover in the 
following decades: in 1870 they were about a half higher than in the mid-1850s and in 
1913 about 1.6 times higher. Yet, their share on ‘world’ market continued to slide, 
down respectively to 1.1% and 0.5%. If we consider the export per capita, the picture is 
pretty much the same. The total European tropical fall from 27.8 dollars in 1830 to 12.4 
in 1840 with Jamaica and French colonies falling to less than half in the same period 
(Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6 
Export per capita (1913$): European Tropical colonies  
 
          Sources: Federico-Tena (2016a) 
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French ones.  Their output of sugar barely grew in the period, while world production 
increased by 3.5 times (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 
Output of sugar in British and French colonies and world output share (1870=100) 
 
 
 Source: British and French colonies Deerr 1949 
World Galloway 1989 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Source: British and French colonies from Deerr 1949; World from Moreno Fraginals (1978) 
The massive fall of production in British colonies in the late 1830s and in France 
in the early 1850s coincide in time with the abolition of slavery. Slaves in Haiti had 
successfully revolted in 1791, gaining freedom and independence in 1804, but no other 
revolt ever succeeded. Slavery in British colonies was abolished on January 1st 1834, 
but former slaves remained obliged to work on plantations (for a shortened day) and 
were eventually freed only in 1838 (Green 1976, Fogel 1989 pp.218-233, Drescher 
2010). France abolished slavery only in 1848, after the fall of Louis Philippe (Fogel 
1989 p. 234, Stauffer 2010) and the Netherlands followed in 1863, after two decades of 
debates (Den Heijer 2010).   
The emancipation was bound to affect negatively the output of plantation crops 
as it increased labor costs and disrupted the organization of production. The former 
slaves had to be paid wages above the pre-abolition cost of food and lodging and were 
less dependable than slaves. Unsurprisingly, exports of all polities, except the 
Leeward Island, hit the minimum of the whole period 1820-1870 two-three years 
after emancipation (Table 4).  
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Table 4 
The effects of emancipation on exports of European Tropical colonies 
British French Dutch European 
Colonies Colonies Colonies Tropical 
Before abolition (three year average) 1837 1847 1861 
All time minimum (three year average) 1841 1850 1866 1840 
Percentage changes 
All period (1830-1870) -24.2 12.2 -67.3 -24.9 
1830 to  all-time minimum -51.5 -42.5 -69.3 -48.7 
Before/after  abolition  -33.6 -27.0 -28.2 
Before/after  abolition (unweighted average) -32.9(0.42) -49.2(0.45) -19.2(0.85)  
Contribution of Abolition  47.5 50.1 17.4 
Source: Federico and Tena (2016a) 
     
  On average, after emancipation exports fell by about a third, although the extent 
of the decline varied a lot across colonies, as shown by the coefficient of variation of the 
unweighted averages (in brackets). However, the abolition shock does not explain 
entirely the poor performance of Tropical European colonies. 
 First, as the row ‘contribution of abolition’ shows, the shock of emancipation 
accounted on aggregate for about a half of total decrease. Indeed, total exports from had 
peaked in 1830-1831 and the stagnation had started much earlier than any plausible 
threat of abolition: the production of Jamaica, the largest  sugar producer in the 
Caribbean, around 1820 was about a tenth lower than its all time peak in 1806, and in 
1830 18% lower than in 1820.  
    Second, the tropical European colonies recovered rather slowly from the shock: their 
total exports exceeded permanently the level of the 1830s only in the 1870s and from 
the 1840s to the eve of world war one, they grew at a paltry 1.26% yearly rate. The loss 
of market shares in their traditional export products (i.e. mainly sugar) accounts for two 
thirds of the decline in overall share of exports from British colonies in 1830-1850 and 
for two fifths in 1830-1870 (Federico and Tena forthcoming).  This poor performance 
contrasts with the experience of other tropical American producers after the abolition of 
slavery. 10  To be sure, the recovery of exports from the British and French colonies was 
                                                          
10
  Exports from Cuba fell by 42% from 1883 to 1890 but rose at 7.18% from 1890 to 1913. Exports from 
the Southern United States fell by 44% from 1859 to 1867 and grew at 3.87% thereafter. The post-
abolition shock was somewhat smaller but still sizeable in Brazil (10% from 1884 to 1889) but the growth 
of exports was equally fast (3.49% from 1889 to 1913). 
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hampered by the loss of the preferential treatment they enjoyed in the United 
Kingdom and France and by the rise of new competitors.  In the United Kingdom, the 
differential duty for colonial sugar was progressively reduced, down to zero in 1851 
(Green 1976 p. 229-230). This was part of the final push towards liberalization of the 
British market (Curtin 1954), but it might have also been suggested by the rise of real 
prices of Jamaican sugar under the preferential regime. 11 
 This evidence suggests that even if slave plantation remained highly profitable, the 
extensive growth which had propelled the British and French colonies in the 
Caribbean to the status of world-class export powerhouses was no longer 
sufficient even before the abolition. It is debatable whether they could have 
increased output relying only on native-born slaves, as the Southern United States.  
After the emancipation, the sugar islands had two solutions, either to keep their 
specialization in sugar, and increase productivity as in Cuba, or, like Brazil, to 
change specialization towards a product, like coffee, which could not be produced 
in technologically advanced consuming countries and thus less subject to 
protection and competition.  Jamaica did a bit of both towards the end of the 
century, investing in modern sugar processing plants and increasing the 
production of bananas (Eisner 1961), but it was too little, too late.  
 
6. Conclusions  
      In this paper we have argued that the conventional wisdom about the poor 
performance of Latin American polities in the ‘lost decades’ must be revised because it 
papers over huge differences among them.  The export performance of the former 
British and French colonies in the Caribbean was indeed very poor, as they never 
recovered from the emancipation of slaves. Other countries performed much better. 
Mexico uneven trend and the slope provoked by the US-Mexican war (1847-48) did not 
confirm such a dismal view as presented by the conventional wisdom. Brazil and the 
remaining Spanish colonies, as well tropical countries in other continents, benefitted by 
the collapse of the Tropical European colonies but succeeded to increase exports by 
                                                          
11  The nominal price of Jamaican sugar in London to 1850 Gayer-Rostow -Schartz (1953) and afterwards 
from Sauerbeck (1986), deflated with wholesale price indexes from the same sources (Mitchell 1988) 
pp.723-727). The US real prices are computed linking  three different series of prices for sugar (Historical 
Statistics 2006 series Cc218, CC220 and Cc 220) and deflating with index prices Cc113 and Cc124.  
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investing in sugar production and diversifying in less competitive markets. Further 
South, other independent countries exploited successfully the growth of world demand 
for temperate and mining products.  
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APPENDIX
 Table 1
The Americas (by countries and groups) rates of growth of  export per capita  1820-1870 (1913$)
Label Countries Group Number Export pc growth
II URUGUAY Iberian Indpendent 15 -0.38
II COLOMBIA Iberian Indpendent 18 0.40
II VENEZUELA Iberian Indpendent 25 1.03
II PARAGUAY Iberian Indpendent 28 1.67
II MEXICO Iberian Indpendent 30 1.96
II ECUADOR Iberian Indpendent 33 3.00
II CHILE Iberian Indpendent 36 3.65
II ARGENTINA Iberian Indpendent 37 3.68
II BOLIVIA Iberian Indpendent 39 4.43
II PERU Iberian Indpendent 41 4.57
TI DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Tropical Iberian 13 -1.05
TI PORTO RICO Tropical Iberian 14 -0.63
TI HONDURAS Tropical Iberian 27 1.29
TI BRASIL Tropical Iberian 31 2.02
TI CUBA Tropical Iberian 32 2.77
TI COSTA RICA Tropical Iberian 38 4.38
TI EL SALVADOR Tropical Iberian 40 4.44
TI NICARAGUA Tropical Iberian 42 6.91
TI GUATEMALA Tropical Iberian 43 7.00
TE BRITISH HONDURAS Tropical European 1 -4.98
TE DANISH VIRGIN ISLAND Tropical European 2 -3.54
TE JAMAICA Tropical European 3 -3.53
TE GRANADA (Winward Island) Tropical European 4 -3.03
TE St.VICENTE Tropical European 5 -2.89
TE DUTCH GUAYANA (Surinam) Tropical European 6 -2.66
TE FRENCH GUAYANA Tropical European 8 -1.97
TE St.BARTHELEMI Tropical European 10 -1.64
TE HAITI Tropical European 11 -1.60
TE St.LUCIA Tropical European 12 -1.24
TE GUADALUPE Tropical European 16 -0.15
TE TRINIDAD&TOBAGO Tropical European 17 0.16
TE BARBADOS Tropical European 19 0.46
TE LEWARD ISLANDS Tropical European 20 0.50
TE MARTINIQUE Tropical European 21 0.61
TE BAHAMAS Tropical European 22 0.62
TE TURK & CAYCO ISLANDS Tropical European 26 1.09
TE DUTCH ANTILLES Tropical European 29 1.94
TE BERMUDA Tropical European 34 3.23
TE BRITISH GUAYANA Tropical European 35 3.26
NA NEW FOUNLAND North America 7 -2.22
NA St. PIERRE et MIQUELON North America 9 -1.95
NA CANADA North America 23 0.76
NA USA North America 24 0.99
Southern USA -0.46
Nothern USA 1.61
Rest of the world 3.59
